

File

"Stump Bill"

E 1590

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

April 18, 1985

These students are not fighting the generational war of their predecessors. "These students are often very close to their parents," said Dennis Dalton, a Barnard political-science professor who has been advising several students. He said many of the students felt considerable pressure from parents to end the protest.

The college and the world of adults is not their enemy. "We don't hate President Sovern," said David Goldiner, a 20-year-old protest leader who remembers being wheeled to anti-Vietnam war protests in a stroller. "We think we have a better argument than he does."

Dr. Sovern met this week with five of the protesters, who had been conducting a fast. Anyone steeped in the campus culture of the 60's might have expected tension and invective. Instead, they had two hours of high-level discussion, said Eric Foner, a history professor who accompanied them.

Professor Foner and others say that far from being an exception to the career-minded students who have become prevalent on campus, the protesters are quite concerned about the danger the protest holds to their academic careers and their chances for getting into good professional schools.

The students have clearly succeeded in getting attention for their cause, and there are beginning to be demonstrations on other campuses.

What they have not been able to do, at least yet, is rally the student body behind them. In 1968, a few hundred students occupied buildings, but hundreds more, maybe thousands, milled and marched outside in support.

"In 1968 you had a spark thrown in a tinderbox," said Diane Ravitch, an historian of American education. Protesters, she suggested, were able to tap a deep well of discontent then. "Here," she said, "There's the spark but there is no tinderbox." ●

**H.R. 1082 ESTABLISHES EXISTING CONGRESSIONAL MONITORING OF INTELLIGENCE FUNDING AS PERMANENT LAW**

**HON. BOB STUMP**

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1985

● **Mr. STUMP.** Mr. Speaker, to conduct intelligence activities effectively, the executive branch needs flexibility in funding such activities. To exercise wisely the power to grant or withhold scarce taxpayer dollars for intelligence activities, the Congress needs complete, timely, and accurate information on the use of funds for such activities.

For the past 4 years, the Congress and the President have agreed on a statutory provision, renewed annually, which accommodates both the executive's need for flexibility in conducting intelligence activities and the legislature's need for information in monitoring use of Government funds for intelligence activities. The agreed-upon provision has appeared in statute each year since 1981, with a few changes dictated by experience, as section 103 of the annual Intelligence Authorization Act.

The provision has proved to be workable, and the time has come to make it permanent law. Section 102 of H.R. 1082, the Omnibus Intelligence and Security Improvements Act, amends the National Security Act of 1947 to place in permanent law the provision which the Congress has renewed annually as section 103 of the Intelligence Authorization Act. Section 102 of H.R. 1082 provides:

"Sec. 102. (a) Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES IN EXCESS OF PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS

"Sec. 502. During any fiscal year, funds may not be made available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity unless such funds have been specifically authorized for such activity, or, in the case of funds appropriated for a different activity, unless the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense has notified the appropriate committees of Congress of the intent to make such funds available for such activity, except that, in no case may reprogramming or transfer authority be used by the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense unless for higher priority intelligence or intelligence-related activities based on unforeseen requirements, than those for which funds were originally authorized, and in no case where the intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which funds were requested has been denied by Congress."

"(b) The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding after the entry for section 501 the following:

"Sec. 502. Congressional notification of expenditures in excess of program authorizations."

Section 102 of H.R. 1082, like its annually enacted predecessor provisions, requires, as a precondition to making funds available for an intelligence activity, either specific advance congressional authorization by statute to make the funds available for the activity or prior notification to the intelligence committees of Congress of the intent to make the funds available for the activity. The requirement for either specific authorization or prior notification ensures that Congress has the information it needs to exercise wisely its power of the purse. The provision also accommodates the executive branch's need for flexibility in intelligence funding so that it can take advantage of unforeseen, fleeting opportunities to collect important intelligence or favorably influence events.

This standard provision for specific authorization or prior notification was designed and continues to function as a policy-neutral provision. The provision does not authorize or prohibit any specific kinds of intelligence activities. The provision simply ensures that Congress has the information it needs to exercise its fiscal powers and to verify that its fiscal decisions are followed. Placing the provisions in permanent law rather than the annually enacted Intelligence Authorization Act would ensure that the Congress receives the funding information it needs in all circumstances, even during

the funding hiatus that may occur at the beginning of a fiscal year when the previous year's Intelligence Authorization Act authorization/notification provision has expired.

Enactment of section 102 of H.R. 1082 will assist in establishing a permanent, stable, and effective working relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the funding of intelligence activities. ●

**REAGAN'S AWKWARD CONTRADICTION**

**HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 18, 1985

● **Mr. DELLUMS.** Mr. Speaker, in the contradictory foreign policies of the Reagan administration toward the nations of Nicaragua and South Africa, there exists an embarrassing situation which is nothing short of sheer hypocrisy.

Mr. Dan Gray, a constituent of mine from Oakland, has called my attention to an excellent column by Ms. Brenda Payton which appeared in the Oakland Tribune recently. I agree with Mr. Gray that it is worth sharing with my colleagues.

**REAGAN'S AWKWARD CONTRADICTION**

(By Brenda Payton)

The only thing wrong with Ronald Reagan's foreign policy is that he's got the wrong country with the right policy. Maybe someone slipped the Nicaragua position papers in the South Africa folder, and vice versa.

Because if he applied his hard line on Nicaragua to South Africa, and extended the quiet diplomacy afforded South Africa to Nicaragua, his policy would make sense.

Accepting the Reagan administration rhetoric that the Nicaraguan government is retreating from its promise of democratic freedoms (which I don't), wouldn't the support and guidance of the U.S. government be more effective than attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government? Attempts that only create an at-war mentality that tightens rather than loosens restrictions.

Conversely, how can "constructive engagement" be effective in moving the South African government, which gets a perverse pleasure from thumbing its nose at the basic universal standards of human decency? Just last week police fired on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators, killing 18, and then arrested 13 black activists, charging them with treason—a crime punishable by death.

Those questions are only logical, however, if the stated interests of the Reagan administration—to support change to benefit majorities in both countries—are the real interests.

Rather, we have a declaration of against a country struggling to harvest coffee crop, and the coddling of a government where unarmed demonstrators are routinely killed and dissidents are arrested, tortured and imprisoned.

It makes for some awkward contradictions.

On one hand, in Reagan's most recent and strongest blast at Nicaragua, he says his goal is to remove the Sandinista govern-

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